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Abstract
Brexit makes both a direct and an indirect impact on the European Parliament (EP). The most direct consequence is the
withdrawal of the 73-member strong UK contingent and the changing size of the political groups. Yet, the impact of Brexit
is also felt in more oblique ways. Focussing on the role and influence of the EP in the EU–UK negotiations, and of the British
delegation in the EP, this article shows that the process, and not just the outcome of Brexit, has significant organisational
implications for the EP and its political groups. Moreover, it also showcases the importance of informal rules and norms of
behaviour, which were affected by Brexit well ahead of any formal change to the UK status as a Member State. The EP and
its leadership ensured the active involvement of the EP in the negotiating process—albeit in different ways for the with-
drawal agreement and the future relationship—and sought to minimise the costs of Brexit, reducing the clout of British
members particularly in the allocation of legislative reports.
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1. Introduction
Brexit makes both a direct and an indirect impact on the
European Parliament (EP), which can be observed with
respect to its organisation, policy positions and political
equilibria. The most direct consequence is the withdraw-
al of the 73-member strong UK contingent, which was
scheduled to take place on Brexit day, originally foreseen
on 29 March 2019 and finally occurring at the end of
January 2020. The newly vacant seats required a deep
reflection by the EP on their redistribution. Furthermore,
the exiting of the British MEPs affected the political
groups and their relative size differently. Brexit also had
consequences for the British administrators and parlia-
mentary assistants, possibly jeopardizing their jobs.
The impact of Brexit was also felt in a more oblique
way. Since the referendum outcome, and especially after
the notification of withdrawal by the then British Prime
Minister Theresa May in March 2017, the UK MEPs were
in a ‘limbo’ situation. Formally, they still enjoyed their
full rights (including, of course, voting rights). Yet, as
outgoing members, they were somewhat ‘diminished’
members, finding themselves in the uneasy situation of
fixed-term lawmakers representing a departing Member
State; many of them were watched with some suspicion
by their fellow MEPs.
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The objective of this article is to provide a more fine-
grained empirical assessment of the impact of Brexit on
the EP and, in turn, of how the EP sought to manage the
British withdrawal. It goes beyond descriptive or norma-
tive evaluations of formal changes, such as the redistri-
bution of the UK seats post-Brexit (see, e.g., Besselink,
Swider, & Michel, 2019; Kalcik & Wolff, 2017). It places
its analytical focus on more informal, but by no means
less important, changes such as the organisational adap-
tation undertaken by the EP to contribute to the Brexit
negotiations, and on the role of the UK delegation, from
the referendum up to Brexit day.
The literature has already provided some assess-
ments, particularly on the formal powers and actual role
played by the EP in the first phase of the EU–UK Brexit
negotiations (Bressanelli, Chelotti, & Lehmann, 2019;
Brusenbauch Meislova, 2019; Closa, 2020; Stoll, 2017)
and on the early institutional changes undertaken by
the EP (i.e., Jacobs, 2018; Shackleton, 2016). Yet, such
studies were written before Brexit effectively happened,
dealing therefore mostly with theoretical scenarios and
hypotheses. Some provide evidence about the period
immediately after the Brexit referendum, identifying ear-
ly changes in behaviour or attitudes by the key play-
ers inside the EP. Furthermore, extant research presents
very specific assessments on particular impacts of Brexit,
often embedding them into broader analyses of the EU
institutional set-up post Brexit.
This article seeks to fill a gap in the existing schol-
arship, providing an empirical assessment of what has
effectively occurred in the EP during the process, and
after the implementation, of Brexit. It shows that the
EP has not missed the change to strengthen its insti-
tutional role and preserve its policy-making capacity as
Brexit unfolded. By managing disintegration, it has made
a further step in its long quest for institutional empower-
ment (i.e., Héritier, Meissner, Moury, & Schoeller, 2019;
Rittberger, 2005). At the same time, its influence in
the negotiations is more difficult to trace, bringing fur-
ther evidence to the argument that institutional clout
should not be equated with policy impact (Bressanelli &
Chelotti, 2019).
In the first part of the article, we aim to evaluate
the role played by the EP in the Brexit negotiations—
both with regard to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU
and (more extensively) to the future EU–UK relationship.
This is based on the analysis of official documents and
original interviews with EU officials and policy advisors
of the political groups of the EP. Interviews took place
either in person or—after the outbreak of the Covid-19
pandemic—remotely. The list of interviewees is provided
in the Supplementary File, with only basic information
provided on their role and seniority not to breach the
confidentiality agreement. It is important to underline
that all interviewees played an active part in the Brexit
process. The second part of the article explores the role
played by the British MEPs in the EP during the Brexit
period (June 2016–January 2020). This section relies on
data such as the official information on MEPs’ careers—
retrieved from the website of the EP—and EU legislation
(Reh, Bressanelli, & Koop, 2020).
2. The EP and the Negotiations of the Withdrawal
Agreement
The Brexit negotiations opened on 29March 2017, when
the UK government notified the European Council of its
intention to leave the EU—although they formally start-
ed only in June 2017. The process ended on 31 January
2020 with the UK’s departure from the EU, following the
ratification of the withdrawal agreement, including the
non-binding Political Declaration by the UK parliament
and the EP. A revised version was negotiated by Boris
Johnson and endorsed in October 2019.
Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union outlines
the procedures for an EU Member State to exit the EU
(Treaty on European Union, 2020). The EP is mentioned
only once: Its role is limited to giving consent to the
withdrawal agreement between the EU and the depart-
ing state. The Committee on Constitutional Affairs was
responsible for preparing the EP’s consent to the with-
drawal agreement, in view of the obvious constitutional
implications of a Member State leaving the EU. Previous
research (Bressanelli et al., 2019; see also Brusenbauch
Meislova, 2019; Closa, 2020), has covered the EP’s par-
ticipation in the Brexit process until November 2018,
when the first version of the withdrawal agreement was
agreed. This research has reached several conclusions.
First, the EP used the scant provisions of Article 50
to increase its institutional powers. Through its power
of consent, the EP managed to be kept closely informed
at each negotiation round and to participate in key
decisions throughout the Brexit process (Interview #1).
The EP became a ‘quasi-negotiator,’ albeit not directly
invited to the deal-making table.
Second, internally the EP’s Brexit activities were over-
seen at the highest political level—the Conference of
Presidents—which established the Brexit Steering Group
(BSG), chaired by Guy Verhofstadt. Considering the need
to avoid a public scattering of positions, preparation
of the resolutions leading to the final consent deci-
sion came under the strict control of the BSG. Most
contacts with Chief Negotiator Michel Barnier and the
Commission Task Force were also managed by this group
(Interview #2). Five political groups (EPP, S&D, RENEW,
Greens-EFA, and GUE/NGL) participated in the BSG: They
put aside minor divergences to present a united front
in the negotiations. The two pro-Brexit groups—EFDD,
where British MEPs had considerable influence, and
ENF—were instead not admitted to the BSG. At the same
time, EP standing committees were side-lined to a large
extent, and their inputs onto the EP’s position was rather
marginal. This also had the effect that the EP’s Brexit res-
olutions were quite succinct and focussed—directed at
signalling the EP’s positions and redlines to the EU and
UK negotiators.
Politics and Governance, 2021, Volume 9, Issue 1, Pages 16–26 17
Third, the restricted and senior composition of the
BSG has allowed the EP to engage in the political strate-
gizing of the negotiations. The BSG worked very close-
ly and constructively with the EU Council and particu-
larly with the Commission’s Task Force. Significantly, the
EP and the Commission developed a well-oiled mech-
anism of sending out mutually useful and reinforcing
political signals, usually arriving at a strong coherence
of tactics and strategy. Commission officials were often
coordinating with the EP political groups on what and
how the latter should report to the press. There were
moments in the withdrawal agreement negotiations
where the BSG decided to tactically intervene publicly
in support of a certain position, after consulting with
Barnier (Interview #4).
Fourth, the EP, EU Council and Commission had very
similar preferences and, as a consequence, it is often dif-
ficult to detect the EP’s specific influence in the nego-
tiations. More specifically, the EP chose to concentrate
on citizens’ rights, with the other two priority issues
(the financial settlement and the Irish border) remaining
less salient. According to observers of the negotiations
(e.g., Usherwood, 2018), the Council, the UK govern-
ment and even the Commission attributed less impor-
tance to the quite existential problems arising for many
British and EU individuals as a consequence of Brexit.
The EP insisted instead quite strongly on issues such as
applications for permanent residency, work permits or
travel regulations. In fact, in this field, the EP managed
to directly change some provisions of the withdrawal
agreement, for instance with regard to the guarantees
of citizens’ rights during the transition period and to the
rights of future spouses of EU/UK citizens (Interview #3).
Throughout the negotiations, the EP also supported and
gave a voice to activist groups and European Citizens’
Initiatives trying to reverse Brexit or to maintain EU cit-
izenship for British citizens after the withdrawal.
Since November 2018, the Brexit process had
stalled—given the repeated failures of May’s govern-
ment to push the withdrawal agreement through the
UK parliament. It got revitalised when Johnson became
prime minister: His government aimed and managed
to change the nature of the Irish backstop and a few
aspects of the Political Declaration. This revised version
was the one eventually voted at Westminster and in the
EP. Over this later period, the EP passed two additional
resolutions—with the total of the EP’s Brexit resolutions
during the withdrawal agreement negotiations amount-
ing to six.
On 18 September 2019, the EP adopted a resolution
confirming its support for the current withdrawal agree-
ment. MEPs stated that they would be ready to revert to
a Northern Ireland-only backstop, but they would reject
a deal without a backstop. In terms of the future rela-
tionship, they reiterated the points made in the March
2018 resolution. The EP called again for an association
agreement with the UK, and it vigorously recalled that
high level of access to EU market would need to come
with strong level playing field provisions—absent which
the EP will fail to ratify the future trade agreement.
The September 2019 resolution also confirmed that the
EP’s “first priority” in the withdrawal agreement negoti-
ations was safeguarding the rights of EU citizens in the
UK and British citizens in the EU. It is far from surprising
then that the last EP resolution on these matters before
Brexit day was specifically on “implementing and moni-
toring the provisions on citizens’ rights in the withdrawal
agreement” (15 January 2020).
Finally, on 29 January 2020 the EP plenary approved
the withdrawal agreement with a large majority—621
votes in favour, 49 against and 13 abstentions. Most
speakers in the debate pointed out that Brexit was not
the end of the UK–EU cooperation, although the nego-
tiations on the future UK–EU relationship appeared full
of obstacles. In the withdrawal agreement negotiations,
the EP had a lesser role than the Commission and the
Council. And yet, it displayed a remarkable organisa-
tional adaptability and a strong capacity to apply the
extant legal framework to be involved in the negotiations.
The next section will evaluate the role played by the EP
in the negotiations of the future UK–EU relationship.
3. The EP and the Negotiations of the Future
Relationship
The negotiations over the future relationship formally
started on 2 March 2020. In this article, we cover the
negotiations until the completion of the ninth round
(29 September–2 October 2020). We first trace the orga-
nizational response of the EP to its participation in the
negotiations, and then evaluate the nature of the EP’s
involvement as well as its substantive positions.
3.1. Organisational Adaptation
At the end of the withdrawal agreement negotiations,
some key parliamentary actors were quite dissatis-
fied with the BSG model (Interview #5, Interview #6).
To them, the BSG’s and the Conference of Presidents’
strong control appeared overweening and dominated
by the “holy alliance” of mainstream political groups
(Interview #7). The complete absence of the EP’s for-
mal preparation of plenary votes through committees
was noted and regretted. Several actors felt excluded
from the Brexit process. Consequently, the Conference
of Presidents announced in December 2019 that it would
“reconsider the role and the structure of the Steering
Group at a subsequent meeting” (European Parliament,
2019). In early 2020, even before the UK’s final depar-
ture on 31 January, the Conference of Presidents and
the Conference of Committee Chairs were approached
by both the BSG president and committee chairs, the
latter in particular asking to change the practice adopt-
ed for the negotiation in favour of a proper impli-
cation of the expertise of all committees (European
Parliament, 2020a).
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In their January and February 2020 meetings,
the Conference of Presidents and the Conference of
Committee Chairs reacted to these requests. They con-
cluded that a “balanced approach between maintaining
a permanent structure and enabling committees to ful-
fil their role” was needed, while at the same time the
Conference of Presidents retained “the overall respon-
sibility and political oversight” (European Parliament
2020b). As a result, the UK Coordination Group replaced
the BSG as of 1 February 2020. When accepting his
appointment to chair the UK Coordination Group, David
McAllister assured group presidents and committee
chairs alike that “the prerogatives of the parliamentary
committees would be fully respected [and] that the UK
Coordination Group had a coordination and monitoring
role, without prejudice to the aegis of the Conference of
Presidents” (European Parliament, 2020b).
To find a balance between the priorities of polit-
ical groups (basically, to develop a coherent strate-
gy and to defend the EP’s institutional ‘prerogatives’)
and those of standing committees (mainly, to repre-
sent sectoral objectives and to provide technical exper-
tise) is a delicate endeavour. In the words of one inter-
viewee, the challenge was to find a “workable alche-
my” (Interview #7). Firstly, the UK Coordination Group
incorporates MEPs from all groups, including the two
Eurosceptic groups whose predecessors had previously
been kept outside the BSG. Secondly, the lead commit-
tees responsible for preparing the EP’s strategy and final
consent changed, from the Committee on Constitutional
Affairs to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on International Trade.
3.2. The Participation of the EP in the Negotiations
Although the exact nature of the agreement on future
EU–UK relations is still unclear at the time of writing,
most officials and observers expect that it would be a
mixed agreement, requiring the consent not only of the
House of Commons and the EP but also of national parlia-
ments. The legal basis that was used to open the negoti-
ations with the UK was article 217 TFEU which, among
other things, states that the EP “shall be immediately
and fully informed at all stages of the procedure” (Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union, 2020). These
legal norms, together with the inter-institutional agree-
ments and informal practices that have further specified
these provisions (cf. Delreux & Burns, 2019; Van Den
Putte, De Ville, & Orbie, 2015), assure that the EP is
significantly involved in trade negotiations. However, in
the case of the relationship with the UK, the participa-
tion of the EP in the discussions is greater than that of
any other trade negotiation. The establishment of the
UK Coordination Group is an indicator of that. The Task
Force is also willing to talk to the EP much more often:
“With Japan, you would not get monthly, or even some-
times weekly, meetings with the relevant Commissioner”
(Interview #8). The exchange of views with the EP is thus
much more continuous, detailed and involves a higher
number of people.
However, unlike the withdrawal agreement negoti-
ations, the EP remained quite peripheral in the con-
struction of the EU position. The more open nature
of the UK Coordination Group and the greater involve-
ment of committees removed the space for confiden-
tial discussion with the EP which had existed with the
BSG. Since February the nature of the EP–Commission
discussions has become more top-down—with the Task
Force coming to inform the EP, repeating parts of what
Michel Barnier had said already in the press conference
and answering questions. The strategizing element got
lost, and the EP–Commission relationship has been less
strong. As a result, despite amore favourable legal frame-
work, the EP has so far had a diminished role in the nego-
tiations, compared to the withdrawal agreement. As one
EP official summarised, “the EP is still very involved in
discussions at all sorts of different levels, but less able
to influence negotiations” (Interview #8). One indicator
for this is the EP’s unsuccessful demand for a period of
reflection and debate in order to examine the complicat-
ed texts that would come out of the negotiations when
they are concluded. The Conference of Presidents has
underlined several times that, following the rejection of
any extension of the transition period by the UK, the
final texts must be delivered at the latest on 31 October
2020 to enable the EP to give or withhold its consent
in an orderly manner (see, e.g., European Parliament,
2020c). At the time of writing (mid-November), negoti-
ations were still ongoing.
3.3. The EP’s Positions and EU Cohesion
The EP adopted two resolutions in the period between
February and September 2020. From a substantive point
of view, they reiterate points that the EP had previous-
ly made (cf. the EP resolution of 14 March 2018 on the
framework of the future EU-UK relationship). The goal is
to reach an ambitious and broad economic partnership
with the UK—whichwill require the UK to remain aligned
to old and new EU rules in fields such as environment,
competition or labour standards. The rationale behind is
that strong economic links need to go together with a
level playing field, not to give the UK unfair advantages.
These two resolutions are quite different. The first
resolution was more succinct and strategic than the lat-
er one—though still more voluminous than the average
withdrawal agreement resolution. This is explained by the
different procedures used by the EP. The procedure to
prepare the first resolution still somewhat resembled that
of the withdrawal agreement resolutions (Interview #6).
The newly constituted UK Coordination Group made use
of the BSG’s practice to collect committee input informal-
ly and take responsibility for submitting the draft resolu-
tion before the plenary vote, as the EP had a very tight
deadline for establishing its position before the adoption
of the negotiating mandate by the Council (Interview #5).
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For the June resolution, the Rule 114 procedure
was applied—which, inter alia, guarantees the proper
involvement of responsible committees in the prepara-
tion of plenary votes. The rapporteurs of the two lead
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
Committee on International Trade, steered the collec-
tion of committee opinions in a fairly traditional man-
ner (Interview #7). Although cut back considerably dur-
ing the preparatory stage, the adopted text still runs to
some 170 paragraphs over more than 30 pages. It con-
tains several redundancies and repetitions, and it is
surprisingly reticent in mentioning only twice the legal
necessity for the EP to give its consent to the final deal
(Interview #5 and Interview #6). The resolution also suf-
fers from a problem encountered in several commit-
tees: MEPs seemed to have some difficulty to accept
that, one way or another, relations with the UK are
bound to change post-Brexit. Their wish to keep as much
of the status quo as possible made the work of the
UK Coordination Group more difficult, as the EP’s and
Commission’s overarching normative principle is that a
third country could and should not have the same advan-
tages and obligations as a Member State (Interview #7).
These resolutions broadly represent the points of
view of the five political groups that were already rep-
resented in the BSG (EPP, S&D, RENEW, Greens-EFA, and
GUE/NGL). As they had worked closely in the withdrawal
agreement negotiations, they developed a rather coher-
ent approach towards the new negotiations. They do
have different priorities and emphasise different nego-
tiating issues. For instance, if they all agree on the neces-
sity to preserve a level playing field, they put different
emphases on various themes (e.g., GUE/NGL deempha-
sising state aid control and focussing more strongly on
environment and workers’ rights). Yet, on the key issues,
they tend to coalesce around what the Commission
presents (Interview #8).
The EP’s position is broadly in line with those of the
Commission and the EU Council. There is still remark-
able unity among the EU institutions andMember States
(Interview #6). It is difficult to identify relevant issues
where the three institutions diverge. But it is also diffi-
cult to identify the key priorities of the EP with regard
to the negotiations on the future EU–UK relationship—
whereas on the withdrawal agreement it was clearly pos-
sible to do so (i.e., citizens’ rights). This is in part due
to the fact that the last two resolutions are very broad
and cover thewhole range of the Commission’smandate:
“So what is exactly the breaking point? Is it state aid?
Is it environment? Is it fisheries? The EP itself has not
picked up one or two points on which to profile itself”
(Interview #8). This also limits its capacity to leave a sig-
nificant mark on the negotiations. On the whole, the
EP continues to put its weight behind the Commission,
such as in a statement of the UK Coordination Group,
co-signed by the Chairs of six political groups (this also
includes the European Conservatives and Reformists),
on the impact of the UK Internal Market Bill on the
implementation of the withdrawal agreement, express-
ing deep concern over the lack of progress in the negoti-
ations and over the intended breach of international law
through the Bill (European Parliament, 2020c).
To sumup, Table 1 shows themain similarities and dif-
ferences of the EP’s role in the two Brexit negotiations.
Table 1. Comparing the EP’s role in the negotiations.
Withdrawal Agreement Future Relationship
Formal rules Power of consent Power of consent, full information
Institutional empowerment Right of being informed and of More involvement and more information
participation compared to a ‘normal’ trade negotiation
Organizational adaptation High level political guiding (BSG) Wider participation (UK Coordination Group)
Limited role of committees Much greater role of committees
Intra-EP divergences Significant unity Significant unity
Differences between EP and Strong unity (very similar Strong unity (very similar preferences)
other EU institutions preferences)
Participation in the negotiations Quite active + political strategizing Less intense participation
Overall EP’s influence Relevant on key issues More limited and potentially linked to the
implementation of the withdrawal agreement
EP’s focus in the negotiations Selective attention (i.e., citizens’ Covering a higher number of less
rights) well-defined priorities
Resolutions Relatively short, quite targeted Quite lengthy, less focussed
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4. The Impact of the Brexit Process on the UK
Delegation in the EP
As the previous section has shown, the impact of Brexit
should not be expected only with the actual exit of the
UK from the EU, but it could already be observed dur-
ing the process of withdrawal. There are organisational,
attitudinal and behavioural changes that were undertak-
en by the relevant actors in preparation of Brexit day.
A very telling case is that of the European Electoral Act.
Its reformwas attempted by the EP sevenmonths before
the British referendum, but the success of ‘Leave’ radi-
cally changed the legal and political context. In view of
the uncertainty if, when, and how the UK would with-
draw from the EU, and the time necessary for transpos-
ing changes to the Electoral Act into national legislation,
it became clear that a rapid and pragmatic interim solu-
tion would need to be found. Concerning the composi-
tion of the EP, the adopted proposal provided for a reduc-
tion of the total number of members from 751 to 705.
The difference of 27 seats between the number of for-
mer UK seats (73) and the reduction of the total (46)
was used to correct the non-respect of the principle of
degressive proportionality that still existed with several
Member States in the previous distribution of seats.
Such an impact of Brexit, and the capacity of the EP
to adapt pragmatically to the changing environment in
which it operates, can also be seen when analysing the
role of the British delegation in the EP between the refer-
endum and the definitive withdrawal. Before Brexit, the
British delegation was generally considered rather influ-
ential. For instance, Francis Jacobs writes that “the role
of BritishMEPs has been very great andmany of themost
influential MEPs have been British” (2018, p. 87). Simon
Hix and Giacomo Benedetto (2016) found that the UK
members are selected as lawmakersmore often than the
MEPs of any other Member State, except Germany. This
section assesses whether these assessments still hold
true while Brexit day was looming on the EP. In other
words, has the influence of the UK delegation declined
already during the Brexit process (2016–2019), before
the actual withdrawal took place? To what extent has
the EP—i.e., its leadership—minimised the disruption of
Brexit by limiting the institutional clout and policy influ-
ence of the British MEPs?
In order to systematically address this question, this
section mainly compares three periods. The first part of
the 2014–2019 EP, until the referendumon 23 June 2016,
should not be affected by Brexit. While Prime Minister
David Cameron had promised a referendum onmember-
ship in January 2013, which became almost inevitable
as the 2015 elections returned a single-party majority
to the Tories, the general expectation—at least up to
early 2016—was that ‘Remain’ would win. Therefore, a
‘business-as-usual’ scenario should effectively describe
the activities of the British delegation elected in 2014.
In the latter part of the 2014–2019 legislature,
instead, following the referendum, it can be hypothe-
sised that British MEPs may have started to feel the cost
of their forthcoming departure. Their parliamentary col-
leagues could become more hesitant to attribute posi-
tions of responsibility to the British members, who were
expected to quit Brussels soon and therefore likely to
leave their job before the end of term (cf. Shackleton,
2016, p. 821; see also Rankin, 2019). In addition, allocat-
ing senior roles and important legislative dossiers to the
British MEPs could be symbolically untenable, as the UK
had contested the integration process in an unprecedent-
ed way and its MEPs could not be ‘rewarded’ for that,
whatever their preferences on the EU.
Finally, the third period is the short time in which the
73 member-strong delegation elected in May 2019 rep-
resented the UK in Brussels, until Brexit finally happened
on 31 January 2020.With a very fixed-termmandate, the
newly elected MEPs should hardly be attributed any role
of responsibility in the ninth EP (2019–2024).
Empirically, the Brexit impact on the UK delegation
is observed by mapping changes on the power positions
obtained by its MEPs over time. Specifically, two types
of power positions will be looked at. First, the nation-
ality of the holders of top offices (or “mega-seats’’;
see Benedetto, 2015) such as the Presidency, the
14 Vice-Presidencies and the five Quaestors, and
the Chairmanships and Vice-chairmanships of the 22
(sub)committees, will be identified. Each legislature is
split in two parts, as there is a new election at mid-
term of the members of the Bureau, of the Chairs and
Vice-chairs of the committees. We only focus on posi-
tions which are attributed via inter-group competition,
rather than on positions (e.g., the political group chairs
and committee coordinators) which are allocated within
the groups.While it is possible to include the latter in our
computation, the index gets over-inflated, as it is easier
to obtain positions like group chair or committee coor-
dinator by having a large and dominant national party
delegation in a small political group.
Figure 1 maps the ‘mega-seats’ obtained by the UK
delegation at the beginning of a new legislature and
at mid-term, starting in 2004 (e.g., EP6-I and EP6-II).
It displays both the simple number of offices (with
every position counting equally), and a more elaborat-
ed ‘weighted’ index, which reflects the fact that (say)
the EP Presidency is more important than the position of
Quaestor, or that being the Chair of the Internal Market
Committee is widely regarded as more influential than
being the Chair of the Culture Committee. The weight-
ing follows themethodology implementedbyVoteWatch
Europe (2017a).
As Figure 1 shows, there has been a downward trend
in the number of (weighted) office positions obtained by
the UK since EP6. In the second half of the 2004–2009 EP,
the UK could count on a total of 13 positions, includ-
ing two EP Vice-Presidents. It is worth stressing that,
back then, the Conservative Party was still a member
of the largest political group, the EPP, albeit with a spe-
cial autonomy (hence the group label: EPP-ED). In EP7-I,














































Figure 1. The UK delegation and leadership offices in the EP.
despite the exit of the Tories from the EPP and the forma-
tion of a new political group, the ECR, the UK numbers
remain good.
The number of offices allocated to the British delega-
tion decreases at the start of EP8, but the UK could still
count on three committee Chairs (Civil Liberties, Justice
and Home Affairs, Development and Internal Market).
Themid-term reshuffle, taking place six-months after the
Brexit referendum, did not affect them (cf. Figure 1), but
the British general elections, which took place in June
2017, did so.
As Brexit was looming—in March 2017 May’s gov-
ernment formally notified the EU of its intention
to withdraw—the June 2017 election represented an
opportunity for some British MEP to make their come-
back to the national arena. Most prominently, the con-
servative Chair of the Internal Market committee, Vicky
Ford, stood down to contest the domestic elections,
and was not replaced in her previous post by a British
MEP. Several other senior MEP resigned to take posi-
tions at the national level, contributing to an overall
loss of influence of the British delegation (cf. VoteWatch
Europe, 2017b). For instance, Afzal Khan, Vice-Chair of
the Subcommittee on Security and Defence, was elected
and became part of the shadow cabinet in London.
The most dramatic fall in the number of British
positions was observed, unsurprisingly, in July 2019,
at the beginning of EP9. The British delegation was
only allocated five top jobs: two committee chairs
(both to Liberal-Democrat MEPs) and three committee
vice-chairs (two to Labour MEPs, one to the Liberal-
Democrats). No British member was represented in the
EP Bureau. Clearly, the other members were hesitant
to assign to any British MEP an institutional role in the
EP, with the exception of one political group—RENEW
(formerly ALDE)—which selected two members from its
second largest party (the Liberal-Democrats) to chair
a committee.
In addition to the political willingness to exclude
the British members and minimise the costs of even-
tually replacing them, the composition of the British
delegation elected in 2019 did not help the British
members. Not only positions such as committee chairs
and vice-chairs are allocated using the D’Hondt system,
which favours the largest groups but, as Figure 2 shows,
a very large number of newly electedmembers ended up
among the Non-Attached (NA). The Brexit Party—which
elected 29members (almost 40%of theUK total)—chose
not to affiliate with any political group and was, there-
fore, de facto excluded from the allocation of posts.
While the largest political group, the EPP, continued
not to include any British representative, the Labour del-
egation within the S&D groupwas cut by a half. Only four
Tory MEPs survived the catastrophic election, consider-
ably reducing their clout inside the ECR group. On the
other hand, the Liberal-Democrats could celebrate the
election results, with 17 seats won and a prominent role
to play within the RENEW group. Overall, with such a
reduced contingent at the ‘core’ of the EP party system,
the British delegation would have suffered significant
losses in terms of offices even in ‘normal’ times, which
were of course magnified by the shadow of Brexit.
We made a similar mapping exercise for the alloca-
tion of parliamentary reports. The political groups bid
on the reports in the committees, with the most impor-
tant ones—those decided through the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure—‘costing’ more points. Unfortunately,
the very short-lived permanence of the British delega-
tion in EP9 (which left the EP after about seven months),
does not allow meaningful comparisons with the former
periods. However, the process of Brexit could be expect-
ed to bring down the number of ordinary legislative pro-
cedure reports assigned to the British members already
in EP8. In addition to the reasons previously present-
ed, it seems unlikely that the other MEPs would allow
an outgoing member to shape a policy which would
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Figure 2. The UK delegation in the political groups: 2019 vs 2014.
no longer apply to the UK, but only to the remaining
27 countries.
Following Hix and Benedetto (2016), we compare the
share of MEPs in a legislature (e.g., percentage of UK
MEPs/total MEPs) to the share of ordinary legislative
procedure reports allocated to the MEPs of a country
in a given legislature (e.g., percentage of UK codecision
reports/total codecision reports). If the distribution of
reports is proportional to the size of the national del-
egation, the observations in Figure 3 should lie on the
45 degree-line. Observations which fall above the line
represent countries which, in a given legislature, have
obtained more ordinary legislative procedure reports
than their sheer number of MEPs would let one expect.
Confirming the findings of previous scholarship, we
observe that the UK delegation used to do better than
most other delegations, with the clear exception of
Germany. At the same time, however, the MEPs elected
in 2014 seem to have significantly underperformedwhen
compared to their predecessors. While in EP5 (the only
other legislature where the UK MEPs underperformed,
albeit in a less visible way than in EP8), EP6 and EP7 the
share of reports assigned to the UK members is always
higher than 10% of the total of ordinary legislative pro-
cedure reports, it drops to just 4.6% in EP8. This is an
interesting element, which is worth investigating inmore
depth, by disaggregating the period before and after the
referendum in the 2014–2019 legislature.
To ‘isolate’ a potential Brexit effect, Figure 4 splits
each legislature (i.e., EP5, EP6 and EP7) in two equal
terms of two-and-a-half years, while it takes the Brexit
referendum as the cut-off point for EP8. When observ-
ing the sheer number of codecision reports attributed














































Figure 3. The allocation of codecision reports in the EP (1999–2019). Source: data on COD reports from Reh et al., 2020.

































No. COD UK % COD UK
Figure 4. The allocation of codecision reports to the UK delegation (1999–2018). Source: data on COD reports from Reh
et al., 2020.
drop seems to have hit the UK delegation in EP8. Yet, this
is the period when the Commission led by Jean-Claude
Juncker promised to “do less more efficiently”: In this
context, an overall reduction of legislative output may
not be surprising.
What is more revealing is, rather, the tread displayed
by the red line, showing the share of codecision reports
allocated to the British MEPs. Before the referendum
(i.e., EP8-I), the British members had been selected as
rapporteurs for about 8.3% of reports. This is not a par-
ticularly high value, but it had already been registered in
the series (for EP6-II). After the referendum, and until the
end of 2018, UK MEPs obtained only 2.9% of the reports.
This is by far the smallest value, indicating a clear change
vis-à-vis the previous observations.
All in all, our analysis shows that Brexit, before it
effectively took place in January 2020, had brought some
significant changes to the British delegation. The referen-
dum results reduced the British MEPs’ clout, at least in
terms of office positions in EP9, and legislative (codeci-
sion) reports. The process of Brexit has, therefore, affect-
ed the distribution of power inside the EP, limiting the
institutional and policy-making role of the UK represen-
tatives even before Brexit day.
5. Conclusions
There are several impacts of Brexit on the EP. The most
obvious—and studied—consequence is in terms of seats,
as the 73 seats allocated to theUKbecame available after
its withdrawal from the EU. Of course, Brexit also impact-
ed on the relative size, and power, of the political groups,
which were differently affected by the departure of the
British delegation. Yet, there are other andmore indirect
changes triggered by Brexit. This article has focussed on
two main issues: The role and influence of the EP in the
negotiations with the UK, and of the British delegation
in the EP. This has allowed us to show that the process,
and not just the outcome of Brexit, may have significant
implications for EU institutions and actors.
Comparing the negotiations of the withdrawal agree-
ment and the future EU–UK relationship, the EP chose
a more inclusive set-up for its participation in the lat-
ter, giving a much greater role to committees. At the
same time, this organisational model also created sig-
nificant obstacles for the EP to influence the negotia-
tions. The cooperationwith the Commission became less
political and strategic. While, in the case of the with-
drawal agreement, the EP had managed to contribute
to the negotiations and actively pushed for key negoti-
ating issues (i.e., EU citizens’ rights), it pursued a more
reactive and cautious approach in 2020, notwithstanding
a more favourable institutional context (i.e., its stronger
legal involvement in a trade agreement, which was tak-
en as a template for negotiating the future relationship).
A greater, arguably not too clearly defined, number of
negotiating priorities further strengthened this dynamic.
Moving to the British delegation, the status of the
British MEPs was not formally affected by the referen-
dum or the triggering of Article 50. Yet, the referendum
results were all but inconsequential for the UK mem-
bers. Our analysis highlights the importance of infor-
mal rules and norms of behaviour. Well before Brexit
occurred, the influence of the British MEPs started to
wane. A norm of—to borrow Julian Priestley’s words
(2008)—“institutional patriotism,” possibly led the oth-
er MEPs to side-line, to a large extent, the departing
British MEPs from legislative work. It is all but unusual
for MEPs to coalesce together and suspend or disapply
norms to pursue their preferred course of action (e.g.,
the cordon sanitaire applied against the Eurosceptic
groups; cf. Ripoll Servent, 2019). In this case, the broad-
ly proportional system of allocation of legislative reports
(in EP-8) and chairmanships (in EP-9) was disapplied
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to the disadvantage of UK members. The exclusion
of two Eurosceptic groups from the BSG was also a
rather improvised—and informal—instrument of parlia-
mentary self-organisation. Incidentally, the existence of
informal norms to protect the institutional role and
policy turf of the EP, shared by a ‘core’ of its mem-
bers, further confirm that the EP has reached a stage
of greater institutional ‘maturity’ (Bressanelli & Chelotti
2019; Héritier et al., 2019; for an early and sceptical per-
spective on norms in the EP, cf. Bowler & Farrell, 1999).
To conclude, on the one hand, Brexit has made a
significant impact on the EP; on the other hand, the
EP has contributed to shaping the process of Brexit.
Yet, the pursuit of the latter goal has revealed tensions
between a more political and centralised, and a more
technical and inclusive, internal decision-making mode.
This is likely not to be limited to the case of Brexit only.
For instance, the development of the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure has laid bare the uneasy co-existence
of the more centralised and secluded law-making in tri-
logueswith themore public and inclusive committee and
plenary meetings (cf. Greenwood & Roederer-Rynning,
2019). Exploring this tension further, beyond the case of
Brexit, could cast new light on changing power relation-
ships within the EP.
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